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The control of security for an industrial system demands an
understanding of the causes and effects of disruptive structural dis-
turbances, called contingencies. To reduce the effect of these dis-
turbances one can implement contingency control, contingency preven-
tion and contingency planning. Implementation requires the definition
and classification of system constraints. Once classified as either
an operating constraint or a load constraint, security with respect
to a given contingency can be determined. Based on these constraints,
the modes of operation are partitioned into sets which are indicative
of the security control actions required prior to, during and after
a system emergency. Of particular interest are the actions required
prior to a system emergency, because here it is possible to exercise
contingency control, that is, to alter the security of the system to
make it less susceptible to certain contingencies. Contingency
control has been formulated as a constrained optimization problem in
which the imposition (relaxation) of security constraints increases
(decreases) the security of the system. Security control is univer-
sally applicable to all industrial systems. Yet the degree of
11

implementation depends upon the flexibility of the system and
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Historically, system security has always been a major con-
cern of design engineers, system operators, and management personnel
Yet this concern has not resulted in a comprehensive understanding
of system security. The emphasis in the past has been directed
in many areas, such as: understanding and designing reliable
systems, providing alternatives and system redundancies to allow
compensation for certain disruptive disturbances, designing inter-
locks and prevention systems to prevent the occurance of certain
catastrophic events, designing automatic protection devices to
place the system in a safe condition after certain events occur,
and training operators to evaluate and take action based upon the
security ( or insecurity ) of the system.
The research and literature on reliability is extensive and
will not be reviewed in this dissertation. It concentrates on
the calculation and/or estimation of reliability of the overall
system based upon the reliability of individual components. It
is more concerned with the probability of system failure, the
measurement of individual reliability, and the mean time between
failures than the secure operation of the system.
Whether the system is reliable or unreliable, it will be

subjected to some disturbances which will threaten the structure
of the system. These disturbances are not subject to normal
compensation. However, by providing alternatives and redundancies
the system will be more flexible; and with this flexibility, a
well -trained operator can use his knowledge of the system to
operate it in a safe, reliable and secure manner. However, diffe-
rent operators may operate the system differently, resulting in
differing degrees of safety or security, and consequently different
levels of performance. This means that both performance and
security are variable and may depend solely upon operator ability.
This becomes less acceptable as the systems become more complex
and the rate of operator turnover increases.
To insure that certain catastrophic events can not occur or
more often will not reoccur, certain designers specialize in
preventing events by providing system interlocks. Some events can
not be prevented with any degree of certainty and thus it is
imperative to protect the system from damage when these events
occur. The design of automatic protection devices is concerned
with this problem. All of these design efforts are related and
more important, they are related to the secure operation of the
system.
Recently at Case Western Reserve University, Tomas E.
Dy-Liacco (12) took a new and different approach to system security.
Using pattern recognition, a computer was programmed to assist the

operator in determining whether or not an electrical power system
was secure or insecure. Dy-Liacco's work implied the existance
of concepts governing security control, which could be applied to
other complex systems.
The purpose of this dissertation is to develop a consoli-
dated and coherent set of concepts for system security. These
concepts must be the framework which relates the design efforts
to secure operation of a system. More important is the deve-
lopment of concepts which will guide the design of future control
systems, capable of controlling the security of a system. These
automated control systems must be capable of operating a complex
system with the efficiency and the safety of the most experienced
and best trained operator, yet with the repeatability of a digital
computer. In order to design such a system, one must understand
not only security but also the trade-off between security and
system performance.
The thesis has been separated into four sections, philosophy,
examples, implementation and extensions. Chapters two and three
provide the definitions, concepts and philosophy of security
control. Then, chapters four and five present some general
examples, illustrating the applicability of these concepts.
Chapter six is concerned with an actual implementation of con-
tingency control to a complex process. Chapter seven presents

extensions and conclusions caused by (a) the application of security
control and (b) the philosophical and conceptual development.

CHAPTER II
THE CONCEPT OF SECURITY CONTROL
In this chapter the concepts of security control will be pre-
sented. This will include definitions and explanations of terms to
be used in succeeding chapters, such as security, contingencies,
constraints, modes of operation, and types of security control.
Contingencies
A contingency is a possible but not certain event or disturbance
which is capable of changing the structure of a system; i.e., a
disruptive structural disturbance. Since this disturbance .or event
is uncertain, there is a probability of occurance associated with
each contingency, and this probability will vary under differing
conditions
.
One can consider contingencies to belong to one of two classes:
environmentally dependent and environmentally independent contin-
gencies. An environmentally dependent contingency requires a given
environment before it is feasible. Without this environment or the
satisfaction of a given set of conditions, it is impossible for this
contingency to occur. There may be more than one environment in
which it can occur and the probability of occurance may vary from
one environment to another. Other contingencies are environmentally
independent, that is their probability of occurance is independent
of the environment. In addition to requiring some environmental

conditions, most contingencies are not isolated events but on the
contrary belong to a sequence of events and will not occur unless
the preceeding events have already occurred. Even if the environ-
mental and the sequential conditions are satisfied, many contingen-
cies still will not happen without initiation. The initiating
action may be a very small disturbance. These three types of
conditions can all be collected and expressed as a set of necessary
conditions for the occurance of a contingency. The necessary
conditions for an environmentally independent contingency are limited
to the sequential and initiating conditions.
A contingency can either occur very rapidly or occur over a
period of time. If it occurs over a period of time, then it may
be possible to terminate the contingency before it disrupts the
system's structure.
In order to fully understand contingencies one must consider
what constitutes a disruption of the system's structure. If a
system is composed of interconnected subsystems and some of the
subsystems have more than one mode of operation, then the internal
structure of the system can be altered by varying the modes of
operation of the subsystems. In some processes the modes of
operation may be simply operating within specifications or out of
specification. In the simplest of cases each subsystem can be
either operative or inoperative. In this case any disturbance
which can cause a subsystem failure will change the mode of the

subsystem from operative to inoperative and consequently change the
internal structure of the overall system. In this case the contin-
gencies would be the disturbances that can cause a subsystem to
fail. In the more general case, in order to enumerate the contin-
gencies, one must list the identifiable subsystems and all the modes
of operation for each of these subsystems. There are various
failures which can occur in a subsystem and thus change the mode of
operation. The disturbances which cause these failures (total or
partial) are the contingencies which can be considered for not only
this subsystem but also for the overall system. The causes of the
contingencies and the subsystem failure are one and the same.
A fact of particular interest is that there are similar distur-
bances of lesser magnitude that do not result in a structural change,
and there may be more than one contingency that results in the same
structural change. If there are several contingencies that result
in the same structural change and these disturbances differ only in
degree or magnitude, then one need only consider the disturbance
having the least magnitude rather than the entire family of contin-
gencies. This representative contingency is a critical or threshold
disturbance.
In order to appreciate the effect of contingencies on a system,
let me consider a system S composed of interconnected subsystems.
Some of the subsystems have more than one mode of operation. Thus,
the internal structure of the system S can be varied by altering the

modes of operation of the subsystems. One result of this variable
structure is the input/out relations will vary with these changes
in structure, causing S to appear as a time-varying system.
The system S will not be functional. However, if one identifies
the internal structure (topology) then one would expect to find a
functional representation associated with each topology. In the
case of a static system, let the functional representation of this
static system be a vector function. Let the input vector be u
(subscripted to denote different input vectors) . Let the various
internal structures (topologies) of the system S be denoted by T
(subscripted to denote different topologies) . Let the output
vector be y (subscripted to denote different output vectors) . For
a topology T.
,
and an input u. , the output is y. . .
y. . = f (u. , T. )
This indicates that for the same input but different topologies,
the output may differ. The system need not be static, however for
simplicity this static system will illustrate the pertinent concepts,
Constraints
One of the problems which arises is: after the internal struc-
ture has been altered the system may no longer be able to satisfy
the demands that are levied on the system. These demands can be
expressed as restrictions or constraints that must be satisfied.

Definition: A "constraint" is a restriction on the system
variables. For simplicity assume that the
constraint does not depend on the topology,
then it can be expressed as
:
The constraints on a system can have many origins, such as safety,
quality control, security, performance, operational and continuity
requirements. However for the moment, consider the following two
types of constraints;
Definition: A "load constraint" is a constraint that
results from performance requirements, such
as the supply must equal demand; the supply
must be greater than the demand; the demand
(order) must be satisfied (filled) within a
certain time interval; or the output must
meet certain specifications.
Failure to satisfy a load constraint does not jeopardize the system
in any way, but results in customer dissatisfaction because the
customer's demands (load) are not satisfied. Failure to satisfy a
load constraint jeopardizes the goal of the system.
Definition: An "operating constraint" is a constraint
that results from an operational requirement,
such as a system or component must be operated
safely and/or continuously.
Now if all the system constraints can either be classified as an
operating or a load constraint, then the system and its constraints
can be represented by:
lij £ < Hi • Ij >
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S. CHi i Zij ) * °
where g is a vector composed of the load and operating constraints.
A Normal System
Definition: A system is "normal" if both the operating
and load constraints are satisfied.
Let T, be one of the normal configurations for this system,
that is
aii = ^ ( ^ , li
)
g ( Hi > In ) < °
are satisfied. If a contingency that causes the topology to change
to T- occurs, will the system still be normal? The system will be
normal if and only if
& ( ^ > zi2 ) * °
is satisfied. When a contingency occurs and the new topology results
in an input/output relation that continues to satisfy the operating
and load constraints then the system was secure.
Security
Definition: A system is "secure" with respect to a given
contingency if the system is normal before and
after the contingency has occured.
Security need not be limited to a single contingency. On the
contrary, a system can be said to be secure with respect to a set
of contingencies if it is secure with respect to each contingency
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of that set. It is assumed that only one contingency of this set
occurs during a given period of time; i.e., that period of time under
consideration. The set of contingencies with respect to which the
system must be individually secure is called "the set of next
contingencies". For the purposes of security, each contingency of
"the set of next contingencies" is deemed to be imminent. Before
considering more than one contingency, consider the case in which
the "set of next contingencies" consists of a single contingency.
In this case, consider the previous system equations and the load
and operating constraints:
y. . = f ( u. , T. )
^ij — v —1 ' —j J
g. C Hi , x.^ ) s o
If one of the normal modes of operation has a topology, T, , and the
"set of next contingencies" consists of the contingency which causes
the topology to change to T~ , then in order to be secure with res-
pect to this contingency the system must satisfy the following:
yi2 t ( ^ . 12 )
£ ( Hi > Zii ) * °
• & C Hi, . ^ ) «
The first two equations will be satisfied because they follow directly
from the set of system equations. The first inequality will be
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satisfied because ^ is a topology corresponding to a normal system.
The second inequality is a security constraint. By restricting the
system to those inputs and outputs which satisfy this inequality,
one can insure it will not be violated. This will insure that the
system will remain normal even if this contingency occurs. Note
that only for this restricted set of inputs and outputs, T is a
topology corresponding to a normal system. The unrestricted set of
inputs and outputs for this topology may not satisfy this constraint.
Definition: A "security constraint" is a constraint that
results from security requirements, i.e., the
desire to be secure with respect to a given
contingency
.
It may be necessary to impose additional constraints on a sys-
tem, in order to insure that the system is secure with respect to
a given contingency. If security were the only consideration, then
one might try to select operating and load constraints that were at
least as restrictive or more restrictive than the security constraints
that are required by the "set of next contingencies". This set of
constraints might result in an empty operating space; i.e., the only
feasible operating condition is not operating at all. Even if the
operating space is not empty, the system performance might be
unacceptable when all of the security constraints are imposed. This
introduces the very important concept of a trade-off between security
and performance. By relaxing the security constraints, improved
performance may be realized. By imposing security constraints, the
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security is enhanced and the performance may suffer a degradation.
How can one handle the selection of which constraints are to be
relaxed and which constraints are to be imposed? As before, there
is a set of next contingencies with respect to which the system must
be secure. Thus the set of all possible contingencies can be divided
into three subsets: those for which the system is always insecure,
those for which the system is marginally secure (sometimes secure and
sometimes insecure), and those for which the system is always secure.
Alternatives
After the system has been designed with redundant subsystems
and other improvements for the sake of reliability, can any more be
done? Certainly, a lot more can be done in order to operate this
system in a safe and continuous manner. For each contingency there
are operating alternatives that can be classified according to
whether the action to be taken occurs before, immediately prior to,
during or after the contingency occurs.
Without naming these actions, let us consider their nature. The
actions taken before a contingency are either to prevent the con-
tingency from occuring or to negate (reduce) the damage if the
contingency occurs. Once the contingency begins to occur, preven-
tion is out of the question. However both the minimization of
damage or penalties due to the contingency and the prevention of
other contingencies are still very important. This can be done by
placing the system in a safe mode of operation and restoring the
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system to a normal mode of operation as soon as possible. After the
contingency has occurred the objectives are similar to the objectives
of importance during the contingency, namely insuring the system is
safe or secure with respect to other next contingencies and restoring
the system to normal as soon as possible. The prevention of con-
tingencies is quite naturally called "contingency prevention". The
imposition and relaxation of security constraints to enhance security
and thus directly influence the effects of the contingency is called
"contingency control". The preparation of action to be taken as
soon as the contingency occurs and during the restoration phase is
called "contingency planning", and these actions are known as
contingency plans until they are executed.
Contingency Prevention
For each contingency the prevention will be different, however
the method of contingency prevention is similar. Since there are
usually necessary conditions that must be satisfied before the
contingency can occur, prevention is directed towards controlling
these necessary conditions. This may entail control of either the
environmental conditions, the sequential conditions, the initiating
conditions or all three.
If a contingency has no necessary conditions, it can not be
prevented with any degree of certainty. This is apparent because
the absence of necessary conditions implies that 1) the prob-
ability of occurance does not depend on the environment; i.e., it
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is an environmentally independent contingency, 2) this contingency
does not belong to a sequence of events, and 3) an initiating action
or condition is not necessary. Based on these facts, this type of
contingency is a truly random event that can not be detected or
predicted until after it has begun to occur. If this contingency
occurs over a period of time, then it may be possible to terminate
the contingency before it disrupts the system's structure; i.e.,
contingency control If it occurs in a very, short period of time,
then it may be possible to reduce the degree of disruption, by
implementing a contingency plan.
Consider a contingency that is not really random, one with
necessary conditions. The contingency can be prevented by preventing
one or more of the necessary conditions. For example, if sequential
conditions exist, that is the contingency belongs to a sequence of
events, then by preventing a preceeding event, the sequence can be
stopped before the contingency occurs. Often the expected probability
of occurance increases as the sequential events transpire. When
this is the case, the preceeding events can be used as a forewarning
and they can initiate contingency prevention and/or contingency
control. If the contingency is environmentally dependent, then
efforts to control the environment will result in either partial or
total contingency prevention. Total prevention occurs when the
contingency becomes non-feasible. Partial prevention occurs when
the probability of occurance decreases. The set of initiating
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conditions can be considered as a sequential condition, namely the
sequential event that is just prior to the contingency. The reason
one should attempt to distinguish the initiating conditions from
other sequential conditions is: once the initiating conditions have
occurred, the contingency can not be prevented if all other necessary
conditions have been satisfied. In addition to this, the initiating
condition can be used to initiate the immediate actions of the
applicable contingency plan.
It may not be possible or profitable to prevent a given con-
tingency on a permanent basis. If this is so, then one must consider
contingency control and/or contingency planning.
A special (or familiar) type of prevention is accomplished by
designing system "interlocks". Interlocks are designed to take
advantage of either sequential conditions or necessary conditions
that must occur simultaneously. By adding constraints to the system,
one can prevent the occurance of one or more of these necessary
conditions and thereby prevent the contingency from occuring.
Contingency Control
After all desirable efforts to prevent a contingency have been
expended, then one's attention is directed towards totally negating
the effect of the contingency before it occurs. In order to do this,
security constraints must be imposed in order to insure that the
system remains secure with respect to this contingency.
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In the preceeding section, one form of contingency control was
mentioned, namely terminating a contingency before it disrupts the
system's structure. In general, any action taken before or during
a contingency that attempts to negate the effect of the contingency
is contingency control. If the contingency control is totally
effective, then when the contingency occurs, the system will remain
in a normal mode of operation. It is important to note the diffe-
rence between prevention and control. When • contingency prevention
is totally effective, the contingency can not occur. In the case
of contingency control, the contingency occurs but the system is
being operated in such a manner to insure that the contingency does
not disrupt the system's structure enough to cause an emergency.
Thus the key to effective contingency control can be found by
answering the following questions: can the system be operated in
alternative modes of operation? If so, can one select an alterna-
tive mode of operation, in which the contingency under consideration
will be less disruptive? And finally, are there modes of operation,
in which the effect of the contingency is totally negated? That
is, when operating in one of these modes, the contingency will not
result in an emergency or damage. If it is not possible to totally
negate the effect of the contingency before it occurs, then preven-
tion is necessary and if neither total contingency prevention nor
total contingency control has been implemented, . then this contin-
gency will result in an emergency when it occurs.
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Now assuming that it will occur and that an emergency will be
one of the results, it is logical to question how much damage will
occur. Depending on the actions that are taken after the contingency
has begun to occur, this damage will vary. Actions taken to mini-
mize the damage should be part of a contingency plan.
Contingency Planning
In many cases, once the contingency begins to occur, some
structural change is inevitable. In order to minimize the structural
damage, selected groups of subsystems are quickly isolated from the
overall system. This is accomplished by using fast-acting automatic
protection devices, such as isolation valves, thermal and electrical
fuses, circuit breakers and flow diverting devices. The automatic
protection devices may have priorities, be sequentially ordered, be
interlocked or be the initiating action of other contingencies and/or
more complicated special protection systems. The purpose of the
fast -acting automatic protection devices and other immediate actions
is to reduce the extent of the structural damage, to put the system
in a safe condition from which known recovery measures can be used
to restore the system to normal, and to ease the recovery by pre-
venting the occurance of unnecessary complications. Once the
immediate actions have been taken and all automatic protection
devices have actuated, then the system is in a fail-safe condition.
At this time recovery procedures can be implemented and they include
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shifting from a fail-safe condition to the maximum partial load
condition. That is, one would like to restore all undamaged isolated
subsystems to normal and connect these subsystems in a manner which
will give the system a partial load capacity. This topology will
satisfy the maximum number of customers according to a priority
listing in which a lower priority consumer will not be satisfied
until all higher priority consumers, that can be satisfied, have
been satisfied. As damaged portions of the 'system are repaired,
using a priority system of repair these subsystems can be placed in
service to increase the partial load capacity. In this manner, the
entire system will eventually be restored to normal , and will be
capable of satisfying all the demands on the system. In some
systems, the best contingency plan may be the plan that can get the
system back to normal as soon as possible with a minimum amount of
off-quality product.
When a contingency plan is needed, it is too late to be developing
it. Prior to the contingency, the following should be known: the
least desirable state of the system just prior to the contingency, the
desired "fail-safe" condition for this contingency, and the desired
normal mode of operation after restoration. Through knowledge of the
system behavior and/or simulation, one can determine the transition
of the system during the emergency. Without implementing the contin-
gency plan, this transition begins with the least desirable state of
the system and ends with the simulated state after the contingency.
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Then the control problem is to formulate a sequence of actions
which will cause this transition to terminate in the desired "fail-
safe" condition. As a contingency begins to occur there may be
doubt as to which contingency is occurring or where it is located.
This is due to the fact that an initial portion of the transition
for several different contingencies may be identical.
This necessitates a set of simple yet decisive diagnostic actions.
The purpose of these diagnostic actions is to determine the following:
which contingency is occuring and where it is located? The diagnostic
actions are usually sequenced according to priorities. Sequential
priorities can be based on the following facts; 1) There are vital
subsystems which should be maintained in a normal operating mode as
long as possible. 2) There is an optimal (minimum) number of diag-
nostic actions and by taking these in the proper sequence, the
location will be determined in a minimum amount of time with the
least amount of disruption to the normal mode of operation. 3) There
are locations that are more likely to be the location of the contin-
gency than others. These locations are determined on the basis of
past performance and system design. 4) Each succeeding diagnostic
action should depend on the results of preceeding diagnostic actions.
Diagnostic actions can terminate when either the type and location
of the contingency are known or when emergency actions are necessary




To increase the time available for diagnosis and correction,
certain stationary actions can be taken. The purpose of these
stationary actions is to maintain the present state or condition
without interfering with the diagnosis and allow more time for
diagnosis. There are conditions beyond which no emergency actions
exist which can insure a termination at the desired "fail-safe"
condition. Before one of these conditions is reached, emergency
actions must be initiated and at this time additional diagnostic
or stationary actions will not be undertaken. Once actions are
taken to force the system into a "fail-safe" condition, every action
is devoted to this end. In addition to emergency actions, isolation
and safety actions may be necessary to attain the "fail-safe" condi-
tion. When a "fail-safe" condition is reached, it must be verified.
That is, one must determine that the desired condition has been
reached and that it is a stable and safe condition. For example, a
point of conditional stability is not acceptable as it is not usually
safe.
Additional actions are necessary to take the system from the
"fail-safe" condition to a partial load condition. These actions
are recovery or restorative type actions and can be taken with care
when time and the situation will permit partial restoration. These
actions are often the reverse of the diagnostic, isolation and
safety actions taken during the emergency. As the repairs are
completed, transitions to other partial load conditions will be
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permitted until the entire system is restored to normal. Since
recovery actions from various "fail-safe" conditions have already
been planned, the transition from one partial load condition to
another can be accomplished safely by returning to a "fail-safe"
condition and then using these tested pre-planned actions. This
will eliminate the expense of developing plans between all of the
various partial load conditions. In addition, the use of existing
safe procedures for obtaining optimal loading for various partial
loads demanded during the normal mode of operation will reduce the
work involved in planning restorative actions.
Modes of Operation
As previously mentioned, as the internal structure of a system
changes the mode of operation changes. This can result in a large
number of topologies for the larger composite system. Each identi-
fiable system topology can be considered to be a mode of operation
for the system. The number of different modes of operation can be
quite large, in fact, if instead of discrete modes for each sub-
system, if any one subsystem has a continuous mode of operation
where the mode can be altered in a continuous manner over a range
of values, then there will be an infinite number of modes for this
subsystem and an infinite number of modes for the composite system.
If one desires to limit the modes and insure that there is a finite
number of modes, then each continuous range can be divided into a
finite number of increments.
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Since this number will be large for a complex system, it is
worthwhile to consider certain collections (sets) of these modes.
For security control, a natural partitioning occurs if one considers
those sets which are separated by the system constraints. Whenever
the operating and load constraints are satisfied, the system is in
one of the normal modes of operation. If either a load or an opera-
ting constraint can not be satisfied, then the system is in one of
the abnormal modes of operation. There are, three types of abnormal
modes of operation: a set of alarm modes in which the operating
constraints are not satisfied but the load constraints can be satis-
fied, a set of emergency modes in which neither the operating nor
the load constraints can be satisfied, and a set of restorative modes
in which the load constraints can not be satisfied but the operating
constraints can be satisfied. This decomposition is natural because
it is related to the condition of the system prior to, immediately
prior to, during and after a system emergency.
In a normal mode the security control effort is devoted to
contingency prevention and contingency control. In an alarm mode,
additional security constraints are imposed in order to prevent the
occurance of other contingencies and to reduce or negate the effect
of the contingency that has begun to occur. Contingency prevention
and contingency control for the other contingencies continue as
before, unless this contingency is one of the necessary conditions
for another contingency. In an emergency mode or a restorative
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mode, the contingency has either begun to occur or has occurred and
the control effort is devoted to the implementation of a contingency
plan. The security control actions can be called preventative,
corrective, emergency and restorative actions corresponding to the
four sets of modes: normal, alarm, emergency and restorative.
Of particular interest is the security control actions associated
with the normal and alarm sets of modes because in these cases it
is possible to adjust the operation of the system by the imposition
(and relaxation) of security constraints to enhance (and degrade)
the security of the system.
Figure 2-1 depicts pictorially the relationship between the
various modes of operation and the load and operating constraints
for some hypothetical system. Security constraints have not been
shown on this figure. In this figure the normal operating space is




In order to remain secure one must operate the system in such a
manner as to avoid violation of this boundary. Thus there are two
mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive subsets of this
normal operating space (a secure and an insecure subset) . Con-
ceptually this is shown in Figure 2-2.
Figure 2-2
Once a "set of next contingencies" has been chosen the boundary of
the secure region is fixed. This boundary is made up of the security
constraints that are associated with a particular "set of next
contingencies". Ideally one would like to be able to concisely
enumerate these security constraints. If this can be done then the
security control problem becomes a constrained optimization problem.
For the case where the security constraints can not be enumerated,
then this boundary must be estimated. When pattern recognition is
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used to determine whether or not a system is secure or insecure, the
pattern recognizer constructs an approximation to this boundary and
then uses this approximation to determine whether an untested opera-
ting point lies interior or exterior to this boundary. The opposite
approach is to exactly determine the boundary by listing the appli-
cable security constraints. If this can be done, then the trade-off
between security and performance can be defined exactly. Using this
trade-off relationship one can determine when to impose and relax
individual security constraints. This is what is being done by
operators when they make decisions concerning security and perform-
ance. The most significant difference is operators make their
decisions based upon experience rather than the solution of a
constrained optimization problem. Thus their decisions may not be
repeatable or consistent, and may vary from one operator to the
next.
Now that the alternatives have been described a method of
selecting which alternative should be implemented must be developed.
In order to decide this, the cost of the various alternatives must
be compared. This decision and the associated costs will be the
subject of the next chapter.

CHAPTER III
COST OF SECURITY CONTROL
In this chapter the decision process for selecting security
control alternatives will be developed. This decision process
depends ort the costs of these alternatives as well as many other
factors. One should note the importance of the planning horizon.
The decision to implement or not implement a security control action
will depend directly on the planning horizon. For any given con-
tingency, the total cost will be the sum of the costs due to contin-
gency prevention, contingency control, and contingency planning.
Before considering any specific action, one must understand
how to justify any security control action without specifying whether
or not it is contingency prevention, contingency control, or contin-
gency planning. Let L r be the penalty if a given contingency
occurs without security control. Let P f be the expected frequency
of occurance for this contingency in a given planning horizon. That
is, if one expects the contingency to occur twice within this time
period, then P r = 2.0. If one expects an occurance once in twice
this amount of time, then P r = 0.5. Then the EMV (expected















The more negative the EMV, the larger the expected loss. This is
the reference value for all security control cost decisions. Any
control action (preventative, corrective, emergency or restorative)
must reduce this weighted penalty by an amount greater than its
cost (per unit time) in order to be justified. Let C be the cost
a.
(per unit time) of the action and EMV be the expected monetary
a
value if the action is taken, then security control is justified
if and only if the expected gain is greater than the cost of the
action.
EMV - EMV r > C
a ref a
If the cost of the action and the expected monetary value of the
loss with the action are considered as variables which will depend
upon the type of action taken, one can maximize
EMV - C - EMV r
a a ref
in order to determine which action to take.
There are two special cases, namely total contingency preven-
tion and total contingency control. In each of these cases, the EMV
becomes zero. In the case of total prevention, it is zero because
the expected frequency of occurance is reduced to zero. In the
other case, the penalty is reduced to zero because the contingency
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has been negated. In both of these cases, the cost (per unit time)
of the action can be as high as the reference EMV and the justifica-
tion criterion will still be satisfied. If either can be achieved,
then a very simple set of Boolean decisions can be used to compare
the costs with the reference. The result of this decision process
will be either contingency prevention, control or planning but it
will not be a combination of the actions. If neither total con-
tingency prevention nor total contingency control can be imposed,
then partial actions or contingency planning must be considered.
When one considers partial actions, a combination may result in
the greatest reduction of EMV at a minimum cost.
Thus, the decision process depends upon one's ability to
evaluate the loss, the expected frequency of occurance, and the
costs (per unit time) of the actions. As in most realistic deci-
sion processes, the EMV can be estimated if there is insufficient
knowledge of the system to actually calculate the appropriate
numbers
.
Cost of Contingency Prevention
Contingency prevention usually requires additional equipment
to monitor and regulate certain of the system parameters. This
involves a capital investment and the imposition of additional
constraints on the system. These constraints are operating con-
straints, for without them continuous operation may be in jeopardy.
The cost of the equipment, installation, and operation are fixed
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costs. Therefore, they do not affect the optimization. These costs
must be divided over a period of time (the planning horizon) . The
new operating constraint will affect the steady state operating point
and the performance if this constraint becomes an active constraint.
If it is active, then the continuous reduction of performance must
also be divided by the appropriate planning horizon. If it is
inactive, it will not affect the desired steady state operating point,
however new security constraints may be necessary to insure that
this operating constraint is not violated. If this is required, it
is contingency control and the cost (per unit time) of imposing and
relaxing these security constraints must be considered under contin-
gency control.
The Cost of Contingency Control
The cost associated with contingency control can be calculated
in a straightforward manner. Since contingency control requires the
imposition and relaxation of security constraints, the overall sys-
tem performance index can be used to calculate the cost. If one
solves the optimization problem with and without the security con-
straints for a given contingency, the corresponding operating points
will have indices of performance associated with those points. The
cost of contingency control for a given contingency is the difference
between the performance with and without security constraints. Thus,




It is important to note that the expected frequency of occur-
ance may vary as a function of the operating point. If this is the
case, then the decision to implement contingency control for a given
contingency becomes a dynamic decision-making problem, requiring a
measurement or estimation of the current operating point. If this
is the case, both reference EMV and the action EMV will vary as a
function of the operating point. This requires that the contingency
control problem be updated and re-evaluated periodically. This is
a higher stratum feedback mechanism that resembles normal feedback
control. This will be explained in greater detail in chapter six.
Cost of Contingency Planning
If there is any reason to believe that the contingency will
occur -and result in damage in spite of efforts to prevent it or
negate the effect of the contingency, then a contingency plan is
needed to reduce the penalty (damage) . Note that the decision is
not whether a contingency plan is needed but how elaborate a plan
can be afforded.
The actions to be taken can be divided into two types, those
that depend upon only the contingency and those that depend upon
the contingency and the operating point of the system. The first
type constitutes the framework of the contingency plan and the
others are appended to this framework according to the situation.
The cost of the framework actions can be neglected as these actions
will be taken if the contingency occurs and the damage is to be
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minimized. It is no more costly to develop them in advance than to
develop them as the contingency occurs. Usually it is less costly.
In the case of the second type, the actions can be developed in
advance for many situations, can be developed in advance for only
the worst situation, or can be developed for a few typical situa-
tions. The necessary simulation and computer programs can be
developed without working out actions for any particular situation,
or the planning can be neglected in favor or reliance upon the
training and ability of the operators. Clearly, a large risk (ex-
pected frequency of occurance ) and a severe penalty will justify
more pre-planning and training. The framework actions require very
little simulation since they are often based upon the macro-
characteristics of the system. On the contrary, the details of the
appended actions often require accurate and costly simulations.
Assume that one can estimate the cost (per unit time) of any portion
of the contingency plan. Then to justify this portion of the plan
the EMV must be increased by an amount greater than this cost.
In conclusion, it is important to note that if the contingency
can not be prevented or negated then a loss will occur as a result
of the contingency. This establishes a reference standard for making
decisions concerning security control. That is, the weighted penalty
(EMV of the loss) which will result when there is no security control
is the reference and to justify any security control it must reduce
this weighted penalty and the cost must be less than or equal to the
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the penalty reduction. This will insure that the sum of the new
EMV and the total cost is less than or equal to the original




EXAMPLES OF SECURITY CONTROL
In the next three chapters several examples of security control
will be presented. The purpose of these examples is to illustrate
the applicability of security control to familiar industrial situa-
tions. However, this does not imply that security control is
limited to industrial systems. The concepts developed in this re-
search can be applied to almost any system. Application appears to
be easier on those systems to which multi- level control techniques
have been applied. For these systems, all of the levels of control
need not be fully developed. This will become more apparent in
chapter six, where security control is applied to a system previously
subjected to only direct control. This chapter will describe the
glass manufacturing process, contingencies that threaten this system
and areas were security control can be applied. The emphasis is on
the applicability of security control. Some of the contingency
control examples have been deferred to a later chapter, where they
will be discussed in greater detail.
In Figure 4-1, the glass manufacturing system has been illus-
trated in a block diagram form. This is, of course, an over-
simplified representation.
As shown, previously ordered raw materials -of acceptable quality





















characteristics and hence must be packed, unloaded, processed,
stored, and mixed in a distinctive way. These raw materials are
transferred to storage bins, which have been designed to prevent
contamination, caking and other environmental changes. The raw
materials are precisely measured as they are removed from storage
and accurately weighted prior to transfer to the mixer. Upon com-
pletion of the mixing, the dry batch is transported to intermediate
storage and then to the rear of the glass furnace, where it is
automatically and continuously fed into the melting end of the
furnace
.
The glass furnace is separated into two distinct ends, a melting
end and a working end. A rotating auger is often used to feed the
batch mixture into the melting end where it is melted by the roaring
jets of flame that shoot across the top of the pool of molten glass.
The melting end is separated from the working end by a bridge wall
that has a throat at the bottom which allows the properly refined
and partially cooled glass to flow into the working end. In the
working end, the glass in a vitreous state cools to the desired
working or gathering temperatures. While cooling, the bubbles con-
tinue to fine out.
Connected to the working end are numerous forehearths, which
are used to maintain the glass at the proper temperature for gathering
and working. Automatic glass feeding machines, .utilizing conditioned
glass from the forehearth, produce gobs of glass of a predetermined
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size, shape and temperature for the glass working machinery. Glass
working includes a vast variety of methods and techniques such as
blowing, pressing, casting, drawing and combinations of these. For
process control purposes, it is sufficient to recognize that the
glass working dictates the desired physical state of the glass en-
tering the working device and that upon leaving the device the
physical state of the glass, although changed, is fixed and specified.
After the glassware is shaped by the glass working machines, it
is in a semi-finished state and must be either rejected, stored or
finished. Finishing means cracking the object off, then smoothing
any rough edges (by grinding and fire polishing) and then annealing
to remove any unequally strained conditions. In annealing, the
object is heated in a lehr to some constant temperature in the
annealing range. At this temperature, most of the strain is relived
by viscous flow and then the object is slowly cooled in order to
prevent the introduction of any new strains. After annealing, the
glass object may require decoration. Decorative processes include
etching, sand blasting, cutting, engraving, enameling and various
methods of coloring the glass with designs. After the decorating
has been completed, additional firing may be necessary in order to
make the decoration permanent. After this, the product receives
its final acceptance (or rejection) inspection. If the glassware




The overall objective of the glass manufacturing process is to
produce glassware according to customer demand (orders). That is,
produce the required number of each specified type of glassware, on
or prior to a delivery date. Economically one would like to produce
the glassware at a minimum cost. Once a production line has been
set up and started, the glassware will be produced at minimum cost
if the production line can be kept in continuous operation, and the
number of rejects can be minimized. The minimization of the per-
centage of rejects can be accomplished by selecting plant operating
parameters that maximize throughout subject to quality control con-
straints. In order to keep the production line in continuous opera-
tion, one must analyse those contingencies that are capable of
shutting down the production line. One is definitely interested in
the contingencies that can damage the production process and thereby
increase the downtime and the financial loss occurring as a result
of this downtime. In addition to these, contingencies that can
cause the plant parameters to be out of specification (resulting in
poor quality glass) must be considered.
The contingencies of particular interest are those which
jeopardize production, the rate of production or delivery dates.
Some of the contingencies that have been realistic contingencies










Loss of a Major Utility
Loss of Temperature Control
Stirring Rod Failure
Loss of Flow Rate Control
Glass Feeding Machine Failure
Glass Working Machine Failure
Conveyor System Failure
Improper Quality Control
Loss of the Finished Product
Removal System
There are other contingencies which have not been listed. Their
omission does not imply that they are less significant, only that
they are less obvious. It is worthwhile to consider each of these
that have been listed in detail.
An inventory outage at any point in the production line can
either halt production or reduce the overall rate of production.
If the inventory is of a raw material that is common to all glasses
then all of the glass furnaces could eventually be brought to an
idle condition. If it is a raw material that is used for only cer-
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tain specialty glasses, then the outage may only affect one glass
furnace. There are numerous holding or storage facilities that act
as surge tanks in the system. However, a sustained outage will
eventually deplete one or more of these reservoirs. An inventory
outage is not restricted to raw materials at the batch end of the
process. For example, if there is an inventory outage of packing
material used at the output of the system, or a decorating color
used at an intermediate point on the conveyor system, the stacking
up of semi -finished and finished products would soon bring the con-
veyor system to a halt.
Throughout the glass manufacturing process there are vital
pieces of equipment. If one is damaged or fails to operate properly
the process will be brought to a standstill until it can be repaired.
For example, at the mixing facility there is often only one mixer.
Behind each furnace is a hoist for moving the batch hoppers into
position. At the rear of each furnace is an auger for feeding the
mixer batch into the furance. If any of the previously mentioned
items fail and can not be replaced or repaired within a certain time
duration, the glass furnace and all of the production lines being
fed by that furnace will become idle. Downstream of the furnace
there are pieces of equipment that are vital to the production line
in which they are located. For example, after each forehearth is
a stirring assembly. Feeding each production line is a glass feeding
machine. Downstream of the glass feeding machine are a whole series
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of machines, conveyors, motors and other devices that are connected
in series. Together they constitute the glass working, annealing
and finishing systems. These systems are connected continuously and
can be called the conveyor system. Failure of any element in this
conveyor system would bring the individual line to an idle condition
and reduce the overall rate of production. This illustrates two dif-
ferent types of vital pieces of equipment, one which is vital to the
entire process and the loss of which is capable of reducing the over-
all production rate to zero and the other which is vital to a paral-
lel subsystem of the process and if lost is capable of reducing the
production rate of that subsystem to zero.
Continuing with the individual contingencies, the next to be con-
sidered is product contamination. The most obvious source of con-
tamination is the introduction of either the wrong materials or the
wrong amount of materials prior to mixing. If the constituents of
a dry batch separate, the mixture becomes "unmixed". If this unmixed
batch is introduced into the furnace, the glass which is produced may
have cords and seeds. It is possible to introduce a batch hopper
that was destined for a given furnace into the wrong furnace causing
the entire contents of the furnace to become contaminated. This
contingency differs in magnitude from the introduction of the wrong
materials or contaminates into the batch prior to mixing. Both
result in bad glass that may not pass the required quality control
inspections. The other source of contamination is the erosion of
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the refractory material that is used for the construction of the
furnace. This erosion not only produces contamination and stones,
but it can lead to a glass leak.
There are several contingencies that affect the entire process
or can occur throughout the process to one degree or another. All
of the system parameters that are being controlled by direct con-
trollers have certain limits within which these parameters must be
maintained for either component, system or personnel safety. A
failure of any one of these control systems constitutes a threat to
the continuous safe operation of the manufacturing process . In
addition there are certain utilities which are being used by every
portion of the process such as electricity, water, gas and air. A
loss or partial loss of one or more of these utilities can be
catastrophic to the process. Yet these utilities can be services
that are provided by an external source, and there is no guarantee
that they will be provided continuously.
Now that the most obvious contingencies have been discussed, they
can be divided into the following categories: inventory outage,
product contamination, loss of a vital component, loss of a control
system, and loss of a major utility.
After studying the glass manufacturing process and its numerous
disruptive disturbances, one becomes aware of the large number of
potentially dangerous contingencies that can be -quickly found in any
industrial process. This is especially true where the performance
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is directly dependent upon the continuous operation of the process.
How can these contingencies be handled? In general, there is no
single answer to this question. Each contingency must be analysed
separately and a determination must be made concerning whether to
apply contingency prevention, contingency control, contingency
planning or some combination of the three. That is, one could try
to prevent them. If they can occur in spite of our efforts to
prevent them, then there are two more alternatives to consider. One
can insure that the system is secure before the contingency occurs
and thus insure that the system can continue to satisfy load and
operating constraints. If the contingency can not be prevented and
the system can not be made secure with respect to this contingency,
then one can be ready to take action to minimize losses as soon as
the contingency occurs.
In the glass process as it evolved over the years, many of the
contingencies that can be prevented, have been prevented by redesign
of the system. This redesign resulted in the permanent imposition of
certain constraints. These constraints together with the load (mostly
quality control) constraints have rigidly fixed most of the system
parameters. This rigidly controlled system has fewer modes of opera-
tion and thus fewer alternatives when one considers security control.
In this and other rigidly controlled systems, security analysis will
often result in additional preventative measures and contingency plans
for those contingencies that can not be prevented. Contingency con-
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trol will be the exception rather than the rule, as the system is
already over -constrained by the existing constraints. IVhen a system
is over -constrained, only a single operating point exists rather than
a feasible operating space. Security analysis may indicate where
some of these constraints can be relaxed in order to achieve an
improvement of either quality or performance. If this can be done,
then contingency control will be necessary to relax and impose
security constraints as needed. The glass process yielded examples
of all three methods of security control. The description of the
application of contingency control to this process will be covered
in the next chapter, "EXAMPLES OF CONTINGENCY CONTROL". The
examples of contingency prevention and contingency planning will be
discussed in this chapter.
Inventory Outage
The inventory outage can be prevented. However, the prevention
requires tying up capital in increases inventories. Rather than
completely preventing inventory outages, the decision is often made
to reduce the capital investment in inventories and try to establish
an inventory level which will insure that the system is secure with
respect to this contingency, inventory outage. The contingency
or disruptive disturbance is actually an unexpected demand or a
delivery failure. The outage is a result of this disturbance. The
adjustment of this inventory level becomes a trade-off problem be-
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tween security and performance. This can be handled as a contin-
gency control problem. In this particular problem, the contingency
control appears almost as on-line contingency prevention. If the
contingency is not totally negated, then some form of contingency
planning will be necessary.
Product Contamination
For the most part, product contamination in the glass manufac-
turing process can be prevented more economically than it can be
controlled or corrected. Contingency control involves a feedback
loop that uses quality -control information to change the constitu-
ents being introduced into the glass furnace. Correction after the
contingency requires shutting down the production line, flushing,
and restarting the production line.
Quality control specifications and inspections of the raw
materials received can preclude the introduction of substandard
materials into the storage bins. The frequency of quality control
inspections will differ with each material both because of the
quantity used and the likelihood of receiving substandard material.
Realistic specifications will reduce the probability of receiving
substandard material and thus reduce the number and cost of the
inspections
.
In the case of contamination introduced by the mixing of the
wrong materials or the wrong amounts of raw materials, the error
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is difficult to detect until the finished product is given final
quality control insepctions and tests. Thus, by the time the error
is detected, the contingency has already occurred. To prevent this
contingency, the material handling system can be modified to make
it almost impossible to cause contamination. To assist in this
effort, a computer-aided material accounting system could keep track
of the flow of materials. A periodic automatic auditing would
detect possible contamination before it could become a serious prob-
lem. Additional quality control inspections might be initiated or
requested based on the results of the computer auditing. If the
contingency occurs and is detected during routine quality control
inspections of the finished glassware, then a contingency plan need
only consist of a method of determining if additives can correct the
deficiencies of the glass in the furnace. If not
,
then the pro-
duction line must be shut down, the furnace emptied and flushed, and
the line restarted. If so, then the additives must be introduced
into the furnace and the glassware being produced must be scrapped
as cullet until it can pass the quality control inspections. This
feedback loop has an extremely long time constant. However, by
introducing a computer into this loop, the materials being introduced
into the furnace can be altered in response to the quality control
inspections. This would reduce the number of shutdowns required,
especially if the contamination is gradually increasing. This same
computer-aided quality control feedback loop can be used to compensate
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for the contamination introduced by the erosion of the furnace
refractory materials.
Contamination resulting from the introduction of a given batch
into the wrong furnace can be prevented by either using color or
shape coded transportation facilities. By using hoppers of either
different shapes or different sizes, one can make it impossible to
introduce a hopper into the wrong furnace. This is similar to
building interlocks to prevent contingencies. An alternative method
of prevention is the creation of a contained system. Once the
system is contained, then only the integrity of the boundaries need
to be maintained. Again a computer-aided transportation system
can keep track of the movement of materials and assist in maintaining
the integrity of the boundary. For example, an identification card
would accompany a batch as it moves through the mixing process and
then through the plant. The computer would keep account of the
materials added to the mix. If this mixture was incorrect, a gate
regulating entry to the rear of the furnace would not open for the
wrong type of mix. This type of system would be warranted if the
losses involved in furnace contamination were large enough. In
certain high quality specialty glasses this is the case, for a con-
taminated furnace can not be corrected but must be shutdown, flushed
and restarted. Since the greatest cost is the downtime and the loss
of production, this can be minimized by developing a sequence of
actions (a. contingency plan) to shut down, flush and restart this
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furnace in a minimum amount of time.
Contamination caused by batch separation can also be prevented,
when warranted. Separation occurs because certain necessary condi-
tions are present, namely agitation and space between constituents.
The agitation can be reduced and the space nearly eliminated by
compacting the mixture. If compacted into a shape which would opti-
mize the melting process, these compacted units could be introduced
on a continuous basis. The material handling system between the
mixing facility and the furnace could be redesigned into a continuous
system to take advantage of these compacted units.
Loss of a Vital Component
Some components can be replaced or repaired in a relatively
short period of time. If there is an inventory following this type
of component and the intentory can be maintained above some minimum
level, then the overall system can be made secure with respect to
the loss of this component.
Contingency prevention for the loss of a component involves
component upkeep and preventative maintenance. The scheduling of
maintenance during scheduled downtime is common practice in many
industries. The unexpected loss of a component indicates that this
preventative maintenance needs to be re-evaluated. Periodic up-
dating of maintenance techniques and maintenance schedules is an
effective means of insuring safe and continuous operation of vital
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ample of this in the glass manufacturing process is the operation
of the stirrer assembly that follows the forehearth conditioning
section. The contingency or disruptive disturbance is an unexpected
increase in glass viscosity, due to perhaps a loss of temperature
control in the forehearth. By changing the speed of this stirrer,
excessive torques can be avoided and stirrer failure can be
eliminated.
Many vital components do not have alternative modes of operation
and in spite of maintenance efforts will eventually fail. To be pre-
pared for these failures, contingency plans are needed for changing
the operation of the unaffected portion of the process, repairing or
replacing the damaged component and restoring the process to normal.
These contingency plans can include automatic protection devices for
the individual components as well as the overall process.
The following is a description of a contingency plan that can
be implemented by the use of an automatic protection device. In a
glass manufacturing process containing a glass pressing machine,
gobs of molten glass are fed into the female half of a mold by the
glass feeding machine. The other half of the mold then presses the
glass into the desired shape. The hot glassware may be subjected to
additional working and fire polishing before it is removed from the
mold. Eventually a vacuum device lifts the molded glassware from
the mold. The mold cools for a short period of time and is returned
to receive another gob of molten glass. If for any reason the molded
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glassware is not removed, a very serious contingency has occurred.
The mold is being positioned by an automatic pressing machine. When
it is positioned under the gob chute, the molten gob of glass will
be deposited in the glassware instead of into an empty mold. Then
when the pressing action occurs, the mold will be destroyed. In
this case, contingency prevention entails design improvement and
better control of the vacuum lifting device. In spite of these
efforts, the contingency can still occur. To monitor when it has
occurred, an optical pyrometer can be installed to view the mold
cavity after it passes the vacuum lifting device. When the mold is
empty, one temperature will be recorded. When the glassware has
not been removed, a distinctly higher temperature will be recorded.
This contingency can be detected before the damage occurs. An
electrical -mechanical device can be constructed to divert the gob
chute. Whenever the mold is not empty, the gobs of molten glass
will be diverted to a cullet hopper. As soon as the glassware has
been removed, the system can be restored to normal. This can be
accomplished by operating personnel or by automatic devices which
react to a reset signal. The importance of this example is to point
out that contingency plans can be automated and when this is accom-
plished, the device which carries out the immediate actions is a
special purpose automatic protection device.
Loss of a Control System
The contingency resulting from a partial or total loss of a
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control system can be handled by the system designers. Most control
systems have or can be provided with alternative methods of control.
The important aspect of this contingency control is that sufficient
measurement and detection equipment must be installed to indicate
to operating personnel when a given method of control is inadequate.
The indication to change the mode of control must be clear and
decisive. If this is the case, then a well -designed alarm system
can present the conditions and the alternatives.
If the dominant response is slow enough, the mode of operation
can be shifted before the contingency occurs and thus this is a
form of contingency control. In some proecesses, the mode of opera-
tion will be shifted automatically by fast acting automatic protec-
tion devices. In this case, these devices are automated contingency
plans. As a control system becomes more complicated, more alterna-
tives can be provided to handle partial or total failure of that
control system. The decision of which mode should be selected
depends on the condition or state of the process and the nature of
the failure. In order for the system designer to determine whether
adequate alternatives are available, he can assume that all or any
portion of the control system can fail and if sufficient means are
available to carry out the applicable contingency plan, then the
alternatives are adequate. If the alternatives are not adequate,
then simulation will indicate the performance of the system in the
absence of this control system.
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The simulation will also indicate when a "fail-safe device" is
needed. An example of such a device designed for this purpose is
the provision of automatic "scrams" on a nuclear reactor.
Loss of a Major Utility
The contingencies that involve the loss of a major utility are
different in the sense that these utilities are often provided by
an external system not under the jurisdiction or control of the
glass manufacturer. It is difficult if not impossible to instrument
and monitor this external system in order to be able to predict or
prevent a loss. The effects of this contingency are often catas-
trophic and compounded due to the lack of experience in handling
this type of casualty. The loss is usually sudden and without
warning. Even if a back-up or alternative system is available, it
is used after the contingency occurs. Since the loss can not be
prevented or controlled, the remaining alternative is to provide
contingency plans that are based on the experience of operating
personnel and the knowledge of the system designers. The actual
contingency plans that were required by the glass process for loss
of a major utility varied from quite simple to extremely complex.
It may be necessary to automate the more complex plans, either with
automatic protection devices or a computer system. The proper
sequencing of actions, timing, and the assignment of customer
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priority Cf°r the particular utility) are very important aspects of
these plans. Regardless of how they are carried out, there is a
sequence of actions to be taken that will minimize losses.
In summary, this chapter has demonstrated that contingencies
exist in an industrial system and that security control actions for
these contingencies can be developed. For each contingency, the
actions of contingency prevention and contingency planning were
identified and separated. Contingency control was only applicable
where the operating space consisted of more than one operating
point. In those cases, where contingency control could not be
applied, the single mode of operation (operating point) was deter-
mined by the load and operating constraints on that subsystem.

CHAPTER V
EXAMPLES OF CONTINGENCY CONTROL
In tliis chapter, emphasis is on examples which have operating
spaces rather than a single operating point. An operating space is
a collection of feasible operating points. When this set has only
one feasible operating point it will be referred to as a "single
operating point." Contingency control, the' imposition and relaxa-
tion of security constraints, can be applied to these examples. The
examples have been chosen to illustrate the concepts of security
control in a variety of systems. The most significant point to be
demonstrated is the existence or origin of security constraints and
the relationship of these constraints to the operating and load
constraints of a given system.
Power System Example of Contingency Control
Let us first consider an example which is typical of those
systems that can be characterized by a complex network that connects
a number of sources and a number of sinks. In particular, consider
the following electrical power distribution network: three sub-
systems connected through an interconnection, shown in Figure 5-1.
In this system, subsystems A, B, and C are each individually capable
of satisfying more than the load demands in their region. The








By buying and selling power between the subsystems, the overall sys-
tem can be operated more economically. In addition, when one of the
subsystems is experiencing an internal problem, the other subsystems
can assist by providing power and thus make the overall system less
susceptible to these disturbances.
To clarify the necessity of contingency control for this electri-
cal power system, consider this system under the following conditions:
assume the power being produced by subsystems A and C is considerably
less expensive than the power being produced by subsystem B, and the
interconnection lines to subsystem B are each capable of carrying
half of the load demanded of subsystem B. The solution of the
economic dispatch problem under these assumptions would dictate that
subsystem B buy all of its power from subsystems A and C and that
the generating capability of subsystem B be secured. Of course this
is an extreme, but for the purposes of this illustration, it is
realistic. Now with the generating capability of subsystem B
secured, consider the following contingency, loss of a single
interconnection line to subsystem B.
Prior to this contingency, conditions were as follows: the
system was in a normal mode of operation, subsystems A and C were
providing all of the power to subsystem B, both interconnecting
lines were loaded to capacity. Immediately after the loss of one
of the interconnecting lines, the total load being demanded of the
subsystems A and C will not change. However, all of this load will
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be demanded over the remaining interconnection line. Since the
unaffected interconnection line was previously at its capacity, in
an attempt to carry this load, it will exceed its operating con-
straints. As soon as the operating constraints' have been exceeded,
the system will be in an alarm condition. If this condition is not
immediately corrected, damage to the remaining unaffected inter-
connection line will result. There are two safe alternatives. In
order to unload this interconnection line, one can either shed loads
or isolate the line from the rest of the system. Usually the time
required to shed loads is too long as compared to the time until
damage occurs. Thus, in most power systems the second alternative
is carried out. Overloads are handled by fast acting automatic
protection devices. When the automatic protection devices isolate
this interconnection line, the total load demanded of A and C will
be reduced by an amount equal to the loads of subsystem B. All of
the operating constraints can now be satisfied; however at least
one of the load constraints can not be satisfied. Unfortunately
subsystem B has been isolated from the remainder of the system, and
its generating capability has been secured. The load constraint
that specifies satisfaction of loads for subsystem B can not be
satisfied. Any immediate attempt to restore power to subsystem B,
without shedding loads, will result in overloading either the
undamaged interconnection line, the generating capabilities of
subsystem A and C or both, depending on how this restoration is
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attempted. After loads have been shed, subsystem B can be restored
to a partial load condition. Hours later, when either the genera-
ting capacity of subsystem B is ready to assume the load, or the
interconnection line has been repaired, the load constraints on
subsystem B can be satisfied.
Were there alternative modes of operation, in which this loss
could have been prevented? There were many alternative modes.
Subsystem B could have been operated with its full generating
capability carrying its own loads. This is the most secure and the
least economical mode, when one considers only the loss of a single
tie line. Subsystem B could have been operated at a partial load
capacity with or without spinning reserve. As long as the partial
load plus the spinning reserve was equal to half of the load de-
manded by subsystem B, the system will be secure with respect to
this contingency. For this example, the most economical yet secure
mode of operation would have been to have subsystem B idling with a
spinning reserve equal to half the load demand of subsystem B. In
this mode of operation when one of the interconnection lines is
lost, the generators of subsystem B will be required to immediately
assume half of the loads of subsystem B, while the remaining half
is supplied by A and C over the unaffected interconnection line.
In stating that this is the most economical yet secure mode, the
very important question of transient stability of this system was
not described or investigated. For example, can this particular
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subsystem be required to change from an idling condition to half
capacity in a very short period of time?
The more general problem of security of this power system with
respect to the loss of a single interconnection line can be deve-
loped in the following manner. In this example, the notation can be
simplified by using vector notation. However, the origin of the
security constraints for the contingency (loss of a single inter-
connection line) is not quite as obvious in the vector notation.
In order to analyze this system, one can isolate each subsystem.
P
FIGURE 5-2
Then for each subsystem I, let
P. be the power being produced by subsystem I.
S- be the spinning reserve of subsystem I.
P . be the power being bought from an external




si be the power being produced and sold to
an external subsystem by subsystem I.
The corresponding costs are
C
- the unit cost of producing power internally
^si t^ie un^t cost °^ maintaining spinning reserve
C
^
the unit cost of buying power
C
psi the unit additional cost of the power being
sold to an external customer (This includes
the profit plus the cost of distributing this
power.)
C . + C .
pi psi
the unit cost to an external customer
C the total cost of operating subsystem I
If the load of subsystem I is L. then there are certain relations
for each subsystem.
The load of each subsystem must be satisfied.
P. + P . - P - = L.
1 ei si 1
For this illustration, assume that a subsystem will not buy and sell
power simultaneously.
(P
.) (P .) =v
si/ k ei/
For systems that buy and sell power simultaneously this constraint
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will not be applicable.




The sum of the power produced and the spinning reserve of a subsys-
tem can not exceed the maximum capacity.
P- + S. $ a.
l 11
The total cost of operating subsystem I is equal to the power pro-
duction costs minus profits from selling power.
C- =C.P. +C.S.+C -P.-C .P.
i pi l si i pei ei psi si
The maximum power that can be bought or sold is limited by the sum
total of the capacity of the interconnection lines into subsystem I
where
P . $ 3- and P . $ 3-
ei i si l
I. = £ 3-.
3
J
and 3-- is the capacity of the j-th interconnection line into sub-
system I. Each subsystem at full capacity is capable of satisfying
its own loads.
L. $ a-11
If one considers the optimization for a subsystem without security
then
minimize
C =C-P. +C.S.+C .P.-C .P.
l pi i si i pei ei psi si
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subject to P- + P . - P . = L. $ a.J 1 ei si 1 i
< P- $ a-
l l
$ P • < 3-
ei v Hi
$ P . < 3-
Sl 1
CP •) CP •) =
* si y ^ ei"'
In the previous description, the total capacity of the inter-
connection lines into subs/stem B was equal 'to the capacity of
subsystem B, and the cost of buying power was much less than the




C D < < C DpeB pB
Unfortunately the cost of the power being sold is always greater
than the cost of producing that same power.
C . + C . > C .
pi psi pi
All of the subsystems buy power from the interconnection, which in
turn buys power from the subsystems that are able to produce power
must economically. In this example, the interconnection will not
buy power from subsystem B. Hence the solution to the economic






















Any other solution with PR > or SR > will result in increased
costs. Now in order for subsystem B to be secure with respect to
the loss of either interconnection line an additional security con-





This will make subsystem B secure with respect to this contingency.
In this particular case, it was assumed that
6B
= hi + 6B2 and BB1 = 3B2










and $. . is the capacity of the j-th interconnection line into
subsystem I.
Now the I-th subsystem is secure with respect to a loss of one of
its interconnection lines, but what about the remainder of the
system? If subsystem B were supplying power instead of receiving
power then there might not be sufficient spinning reserve in the
remainder of the system to handle this contingency. This can be
remedied by using another security constraint which insures the






= max {py }
To handle the interconnection of these subsystems one can insure
E P - = E P .
i
ei .si
There are many elements of this example which are present in
most security control problems. For instance, the following were
described: operating and load constraints, the optimization prob-
lem with or without security, the trade-off between security and
performance, the existence of security constraints to insure
security, the various modes of operation and their associated
classes (normal, alarm, emergency, and restorative), and the exis-
tence of redundant capabilities. Of course, only one contingency
(that might belong to the set of next contingencies) was considered.
In the security analysis of a complex system all of the contingencies
that are in the set of next contingencies must be enumerated and
then developed in a similar manner. An equally difficult question
is: how can one decide which contingencies should be in the set of
next contingencies (those contingencies with respect to which the
system must be secure)? A thorough and complete analysis of this
problem for the electrical power system was recently completed by
Tomas E. Dy-Liacco (12). However instead of finding the security
constraints for each of the contingencies in the set of next con-
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tingencies, Dy-Liacco used pattern recognition to identify whether
or not the system was secure or insecure. In a sense, the pattern
recognition scheme constructs a boundary which is an estimate of the
hypersurface formed by the entire collection of security constraints.
By constructing this boundary the complex problem of security analy-
sis and the enumeration of the individual security constraints can
be avoided. However, in this approach, only the Boolean answer of
secure or insecure was available. In many systems, this Boolean
answer is not only sufficient but is the only information needed for
safe, secure operation of the system. In these or other systems,
simulation can be used to predict whether or not any particular
action or event will cause the system to become insecure. A
combination of these two approaches can be used. The pattern re-
cognizer can be used to estimate the boundary based upon the informa-
tion available. Then, the optimization can be carried out subject
to the operating and load constraints and also subject to the
artificial security constraint developed by the pattern recognizer.
In the next example, security control will be applied to a
portion of a production line in continuous operation. Recall that
security control involves three approaches to a contingency (con-
tingency prevention, contingency control and contingency planning).
This example will be used only to illustrate contingency control.
The process to be examined is a portion of the glass manufacturing
process which was described in chapter four. This example was chosen
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to illustrate how a system with a single operating point can be
developed into a system with an operating space.
Contingency Control in the Glass Manufacturing System
The portion to be considered for contingency control is tradi-
tionally called the forehearth. However this consists of four
distinct sections: a cooling section, a conditioning section, a mixing
section, and a platinum tube that delivers the conditioned glass to
the glass feeding device. Typically the cooling and conditioning
occurs in a covered open channel whose dimensions are about 26 inches
wide, 6 to 7 inches deep, and 18. feet long. The molten glass enters
the cooling section at a temperature near 2400 degrees. Cooling is
controlled by adjusting the burner- flame level and the amount of
cooling air in the cooling zone. In the conditioning section, the
walls have electrical heating elements and the surface of the glass
can be heated by flames from above. In this section, the cooling
rate is regulated by the combined use of the burners and the resis-
tance elements. An attempt is made to deliver the glass to the
mixing section at a nearly uniform cross -sectional temperature.
Additional homogenity is achieved by stirring this conditioned
glass in the mixing section. This glass must then be delivered to
the glass feeding device. Delivery is accomplished via a platinum
tube. Since this tube may be as long as 150 to 200 inches, it
provides a final opportunity to finely control the temperature of
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the glass. In this example, the final conditioning and temperature
control is achieved by regulating the power to six sections of elec-
trical heating elements which surround the platinum tube. The glass
is delivered to the glass feeding machine which produces a gob ( a
discrete mass of molten glass created by intermittently shearing the
stream of glass emerging from the orifice). This gob then free falls
into a chute and is guided into a mold in the pressing or forming
machine
.
The glass forming machine needs a gob of a particular size,
temperature (viscosity) , and glass composition. Once the physical
properties and the composition are specified, then the constituents
used in the batch mixing process and the techniques of the melting
and fining process will be specified. Since the rate of operation
of the forming machinery is fixed by quality control considerations,
then the shearing frequency will be specified. In order to achieve
the correct size of the gob, the rate of flow will also be specified.
That is, if the type of glass, temperature (viscosity), shearing
frequency and flow rate are controlled at the feeding machine orifice,
then the desired gob will be produced. Thus the parameters to be
controlled in the tube are outlet temperature (viscosity) and flow
rate. If one considers the glass to have a resistance (impedance)
to fluid flow then by maintaining a given level of glass in the
mixing section and by maintaining this fluid impedance across the
tube (inlet to outlet), then the flow will be controlled. This
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impedance is related to the viscosity (temperature) distribution
in the tube. Traditionally the axial temperature gradient is main-
tained approximately constant from the inlet to the outlet of the
downcomer. In this case, the outlet temperature, the axial distri-
bution and the inlet temperature are completely specified as soon
as the desired outlet viscosity and the flow rate are fixed. Thus
this system has a single operating point. This in turn will specify
the outlet and inlet temperatures of the mixing section, and thus
the outlet temperature of the conditioning section.
The initial state of the glass entering the forehearth is fixed
within limits by the melting and fining process in the glass furnace,
The final state has been established by working back from the re-
quired condition at the feeding machine orifice. Now the control
effort in the cooling and conditioning sections is to regulate the
state of a parcel of glass as it moves from the entrance of the
forehearth to the stirring device.
Consider the downcomer as a subsystem of the overall glass
process. The inputs are the temperature of the inlet glass, the
heat added by the electrical heaters, the environment (or ambient
temperature) and the level of the glass in the stirring section.
The outputs are the temperature (viscosity) distribution of the

























is the inlet temperature (temperature of the
glass in the mixing area)
is the ambient temperature (temperature adjacent
to the insulation)
is the heat added by electrical heaters
is the viscosity of the glass
is the temperature of the glass in the tube
is the flow rate
The temperature distribution can be considered as the "operating
point". In order to expand from a single mode of operation to an
operating space, one must consider the origin of the specifications
on the downcomer subsystem. There is a performance index (expressed
in terms of the system parameters) for the overall glass process.
Let this be denoted as
:
P = P (system parameters)
Now in order to maximize performance, each subsystem must operate
at a desired operating point. For the downcomer subsystem, the
outlet temperature and the flow rate must be regulated. This will
result in two load constraints on this system, namely:
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T . = T desired
out out
a) = w desired
These load constraints can be satisfied by an infinite number of
temperature distributions. However, only one temperature distri-
bution has a constant linear gradient from inlet to outlet. One
can show that the 'Volumetric average viscosity" of the glass in
the downcomer is inversely proportional to the flow rate. There-
fore one need only insure that this volumetric average is regulated
at a constant that is determined by the desired flow rate. This is
equivalent to regulating the fluid impedance of this fluid. Thus
by not imposing the constant temperature gradient requirement, there
will be an infinite number of acceptable temperature distributions
(operating points) . To achieve approximately a linear temperature
gradient and yet allow some flexibility, one can minimize the
deviation from a desired linear gradient, and still insure that the
load constraints are satisfied. Before the linear gradient require-
ment was relaxed, the operating constraints on this system need not
be expressed because they were redundant. Now one must analyse
this system for operating constraints. The events that can jeopar-
dize the operation of this system are the loss of one or more of
the heaters and/or the loss of control for this process. For
example, if the power level of any one of the control heaters
approaches zero, the flow and temperature control will be lost,
resulting in a poorer quality glass and a reduction in profits.
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Thus one operating constraint will be
0*6. s q.
l l
where q. is the heat added by the electrical heaters for the I-th
section. Similarly, there are operating constraints restricting
power to below some maximum value.
q
i s Bi
This constraint insures that the heater is not lost due to the action
of an automatic protection device during normal operation. In order
to be useful, the operating and load constraints must be expressed
in terms of the variables of the operating space (the temperature
distribution) . In the next chapter this system (the downcomer) will
be developed in more detail to illustrate actual implementation of
contingency control. To accomplish this, disruptive disturbances
that will cause constraint violations need to be enumerated. Then
corresponding to each of these contingencies, security constraints
must be developed. Then the operating point can be selected so as
to be secure with respect to these contingencies. If one considers
this as a dynamic problem, then the security constraints will be
relaxed and imposed to achieve the desired degree of security.
However, the optimization will strive to achieve an operating point
that is as close as possible to the desired operating point. In
this manner the trade-off between security and performance can be
handled as a dynamically constrained optimization problem.
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Before continuing on this implementation, consider one other
application to the glass manufacturing process. This example occurs
in the stirring area. At high viscosities, the torques required of
the motor that drives the stirring mechanism can become excessive.
For optimal performance in stirring the glass, it is desirable that
the speed of the stirrer be maximized. Yet the torque on the motor
is proportional to the stirring speed times the viscosity of the
glass. As the torque increases, either the drive motor will be
damaged or the stirring mechanism will break. Either of these
events will bring the production line to a standstill, resulting in
a large financial loss in addition to the cost of repairing the
damage and restarting the process. The contingency is an unexpected
increase in glass viscosity. Traditionally this stirrer is opera-
ted at a maximum speed and this is maintained constant once the
process has been started. There is a single operating constraint
and no load constraints on this system. The operating constraint
states that the stirrer speed times the viscosity must be less than
some safe value. There are two security control approaches. One
can implement a form of on-line contingency control. By measuring
viscosity (or temperature) and then continuously maximizing the
stirrer speed subject to the operating constraing, the system will
be secure. As the viscosity increases the speed will automatically
be reduced. As a result of reducing the stirring speed, the effi-
ciency of the stirrer will go down. This may be reflected by an
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increase in the number of rejected pieces of glassware. However
this small increase in the amount of cullet is less costly than
shutting down the entire process. If there is a lag in the measure-
ment, then an alternative approach is to create a security constraint
that is more conservative than the operating constraint. If for
example, one wants to be secure with respect to an unexpected increase
in viscosity of An
T ,
then for the operating constraint
n • N $ K
The security constraint is:
n • N + An-r •• N $ K
where
N is the stirrer speed




K is a (safe constant)
This stirrer will be operated at a speed of
N(n) = K/( n + Anj)
This example is extremely simple yet it demonstrates the concepts
of contingency control for a one -dimensional operating space. It
also demonstrates the fact that the security constraints can coin-
cide with the operating constraints. This was the case when the
viscosity was being measured continuously, or when Any = .
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There are other simpler solutions to this problem, such as the
installation of slip clutches or circuit breakers to provide auto-
matic protection. However, this example was presented to illustrate
the formulation of security constraints for the simplest possible
case, i.e., a one -dimensional operating space.
In these three examples, in order to insure security it was
necessary to impose security constraints. If one were to decide
that the system must always be secure with respect to these contin-
gencies then the security constraint might be added to the other
constraints on a permanent basis. However, if it need only be
imposed under certain conditions, then provision can be made to
relax and impose the security constraint in order to affect a trade-
off between security and performance. It must be recognized that
when the constraint is relaxed and the contingency occurs that there
will be a penalty, damage and/or a financial loss.
In the electrical power example, if the contingency occurred and
the constraint had been imposed, no additional damage or financial
loss would be experienced. This was also true in both glass examples
In the stirrer example, the selection of a security constraint that
involved both a term representing performance (stirrer speed) and
a term that was related to the contingency (viscosity) allowed a
trade-off to be realized in a straightforward manner. In general,
this will not be the case. The trade-off between security and per-
formance will not be a simple relationship.

CHAPTER VI
IMPLEMENTATION OF CONTINGENCY CONTROL
In the last chapter, a portion of the glass manufacturing process
was described in detail. That portion was the downcomer subsystem.
It was used to demonstrate how an operating space can be created
from a single operating point. In this chapter, it will be used to
demonstrate the implementation of contingency control.
The Downcomer Subsystem
This part of the glass process can be briefly described as
follows: glass from the forehearth conditioning section enters a
mixing area. After being mixed, it flows through a platinum tube
(the downcomer) to a shearing device. The outlet temperature and
the flow rate are being regulated by controlling the heat being lost
to the environment. This control is being accomplished by six
sections of electrical heaters which regulate the axial temperature
distribution. Since the shearing device does not regulate flow but
merely interrupts a continuous stream of molten glass to produce
gobs of the correct size, then the shearing device can be considered
external to this system. Thus the system under consideration is a
viscous fluid flowing through a heated metal tube. The following
assumptions were necessary. The inlet fluid was considered to be




be piecewise constant. The fluid motion results from a driving force,
namely the static head developed by the gravitational force on this
fluid. To fully understand this system it is necessary to develop
and study a realistic mathematical model.
The Mathematical Model
This system involves both heat and mass transfer. By considering
a differential element and applying Newton's law of motion, the
equations of motion were developed. The development paralleled that
given by Long (22). For glass, the only body force of importance
is the gravitational force. If one assumes a linear relationship
between the dynamic stress and the rate of strain and also that the
glass is isotropic, then the resulting equations will be the classi-
cal equations of a Newtonian fluid.
8S.
pdVD2x. = pG-dV + Z -J^ dV
1 i . ax.
3 J
where
S = - p6 . . + \o6 . + 2ye. •jl F Jl J)l Jl
p = density of the glass
dV = the incremental volume
G- = the I-th component of the gravitational force
S.. = the I-th component of the stress force per unit
area exerted across the surface normal to the
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= the Kronecker delta
3v- 3v.




v- = the I-th velocity component
y = the dynamic coefficient of viscosity
3v.
a = the divergence of the velocity = Z 5—oX-
1 1
D = the time rate of change = D/DT
For the pressures under consideration, the molten glass was con-
sidered to be incompressible. The equation resulting from the
requirement that the mass within the differential element be con-
served was
D(pdV) =
Using this, the equations of motion reduce to the Navier-Stokes
equations for a viscous imcompressible Newtonian fluid.
By considering an energy balance on this same differential ele-
ment of glass the accumulation of thermal energy can be equated to
the net heat transfer into this element. The resulting differential
equation is as follows:
pdV C |I = Z 1— (V |2- - p C Tv.) dV




C = the specific heat of the glass
T = the temperature of the glass
k' = the equivalent coefficient of thermal
conductivity
Hie exact solution to this set of four nonlinear partial differen-
tial equations has not been found. By making additional simplifying
assumptions certain steady state and one dimensional transient
problems were solved and studied. These exact solutions were valu-
able in making engineering approximations and later simulating this
system.
For example, if one assumes that the flow is laminar and fully
developed, then the steady state velocity and temperature distribu-
tions can be calculated.
2 2
g , ? ? r. - r
v(r) = -£ ("52- ) (r.
Z




g = Newton's gravitational constant
p = the pressure
r- = the internal radius of the tube
l
r = the distance from the centerline










dA = 2 Trr dr
A = the cross -sectional area
c
From this one finds
V = 2 • V
max avg
The average velocity is known and is related to the mass flow rate:
V = w/3600 p A (ft. /sec.)
avg c
where
w = the mass flow rate in lb/hour
p = the density in lb/cubic foot
The Navier-Stokes equations were used to develop the parabolic
velocity distribution (Poiseuille flow) . The derivation and impli-
cations of Poiseuille flow have been summarized by Bird (7) . Another
important result was the relationship between the flow rate and the
pressure gradient.
- dp/dx = k, up
where
k, - 8 / 3600 p A g r.
2
1 ' c 6c 1




Knowing the steady state velocity distribution, one can calculate







2P Vv/i dT j
_| . 1 ( ^2 + _1 ^ ,4 j
Assuming that the radial heat flux is constant produces some very
useful results. Specifically, the steady state axial temperature
gradient is a constant. Moreover, the axial temperature gradient
at the wall of the metal tube, the axial temperature gradient at
the centerline and the axial temperature gradient of the bulk
temperature [flow-average temperature) are all equal to the same
constant. This is of particular importance for it justifies the
attempt to maintain a constant linear temperature gradient for the
entire length of the downcomer. It also justifies the use of a
one dimensional simulation of this system.
In the preceding chapter, this system was depicted as a rela-
tion between a set of inputs and a set of outputs. Now using the
assumption that the heat added is piecewise constant, one can deve-
lop the system as six similar subsystems in series. These subsys-
tems correspond to the six sections, each having its own heater for
temperature control. To reduce the dimensionality of this system,
consider the bulk temperature
t (x,t) = <v(r) Tfx^t>






T. _,(t) be the inlet bulk temperature
T. (t) be the outlet bulk temperature
n- (t) be the average viscosity of the I-th section
q. CO be the heat added by the electrical heaters for
the I-th section
q^. (t) be the net heat loss by the glass in the I-th section
q
T
• (t) be the heat loss to ambient in the I-th section
Assume that the ambient temperature adjacent to the insulation is
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r. (s) - T
Ti T^OO TqGi qg.Cs)
where
Vs) is the LaPlace transform of T- (t)
TT - +T,. are the appropriate transfer functions
qr - (s) is the LaPlace transform of q~- (t)
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Gould (14) discusses the justification of this approximation.
Where
V. is the volume of the I-th section
F is the volumetric flow rate
m^ is the mass of the pipe per unit length
C is the specific heat of the wall
pw r
C is the specific heat of the glass,
p is the density of the glass




= pCr-V C ITC^ ex? { TY~ }n pi avg 1 avg
A more sophisticated non- linear approximation was suggested by
Paynter (25 and 10).
Now that the system has been described; an appropriate mathe-
matical model has been developed; and a one-dimensional linear
approximation to this model has been developed, the process can be
simulated. This simulation will be necessary in the development of
the control system.
Traditional Control
The traditional control is straightforward. On the direct con-
trol level, the outlet temperature of each of the six subsystems is
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being regulated. The set points are determined on the basis of
the performance of the downcomer and the performance of the overall
glass manufacturing process. Overall performance determines the
desired outlet temperature, T
fin ,





have been specified, then the set points, T.
i = 0, 1,2, ---,6, can be selected to optimize the performance of
the downcomer. There are several alternate measures of downcomer
performance. For example, one can minimize the electrical heater
power. This can be expressed as:
T
min C q^
Since qGi = KGi (T^ - T.)
%i • hi <Ti + Vi - 2V














= ( Tn T, T, )
-5 v 0s, ls> ' 6s 7
An alternate optimization would be to minimize the deviation from a
linear gradient subject to the requirements that the desired flow

86
rate and the desired outlet temperature be maintained. The multi-
level decomposition for a traditional control system is shown in







Previously, only direct control had been implemented on the down-
comer system. Before describing the security control that is
applicable to this process, the requirement that the desired flow
rate be maintained needs further development.
A relationship between the flow rate and the axial pressure
gradient for steady state fully developed laminar flow in a tube
was previously given as:
-dp/dx = k, a) n
For each section this equation becomes
Ap. - - k, to n. AL.
But for the entire downcomer,




pgh a k- w l n i ALi
For the case where
AL. = constant; for all i
1 '
pgh = k^ u E n^
i
Security Control
The security control problem is a constrained optimization prob-
lem where the constraints result from load requirements, operating
requirements and security requirements. Both optimization problems
(described in the previous chapter) were considered. The minimiza-
tion of heater power was quite simple and did not really resemble
the actual operation of this process. Minimizing the deviation
from a linear gradient closely approximates how the process is
actually operated. If one attempts a leasts squares fit to the
linear gradient, the optimization problem becomes a quadratic
programming problem. Using Wolfe's technique this quadratic pro-
gramming problem can be reduced to a special type of linear pro-
gramming problem. This approach was taken and was found to be
rather complex and time consuming when one tries to relax and impose
security constraints. Finally, a curve fitting approach (Kelley's
C19)) was used to minimize the maximum deviation from a desired
curve. Originally the operating space was composed of an infinite
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number of temperature distributions. By considering the heat added
to be piecewise constant, this infinite dimensional operating space
can be replaced by a seven dimensional operating space. Each vector













is the bulk inlet temperature and TV is the bulk outlet tempera-
ture. If T.
n
is the desired bulk temperature out of the I-th sec-
tion (found by solving a linear algebra problem) , then the deviation
d. , is:
1 '
In this particular implementation, a linear program was used to
solve the constrained optimization. Therefore the unrestricted
seven dimensional varible d was considered to be composed of two
non-negative variables
.
d = d f - d"
In order to minimize the maximum deviation from the gradient another
variable was necessary, namely the maximum deviation, D. Using
these twenty- two variables, the optimization without operating, load




Subject to: T- - d 1 + d" = T^
d' - 1 D $
d" - 1 D <:
The load constraints are a result of the performance of the
overall glass process. The load constraints are
T = T
and
1 1^ = S;l 2D
The first load constraint will fix T
6
~ and will be satisfied by any
continuous temperature distribution that begins with T~ and ends
with T
fiD
. The second load constraint requires that the average
viscosity be a constant. This constant is determined by the desired
flow rate.
In order to operate this subsystem properly it is desirable that
the heater power be maintained within certain limits. For example,
if the power level of any one of the control heaters approaches zero,
the flow and temperature control will be lost, resulting in a
poorer quality glass and a reduction in profits. Thus one operating
constraint will be







a * »Li +IW Ti + <hi-%i> Ti-1
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In a similar manner, there are operating constraints restricting
power to below some maximum value
q. $ 3-
This constraint insures that the heater is not lost due to the action
of an automatic protection device during normal operation. It
becomes
The third type of operating constraint may result from a restriction
on the sum of the heater powers.
^ < Y
1
In order to be useful in this linear program, each of these load
and operating constraints must be converted into the form
aT Tc A b.
-J -S J
where A can be <, = or > . For this system, this was accomplished
and the collection of operating and load constraints was expressed
as:
AoIs A t
In order to illustrate the development of security constraints,
two contingencies will be analyzed. These are by no means the only
contingencies pertinent to this example. The first contingency will
result in a single violation of one of the load constraints. The
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second will result in violations of both operating and load con-
straints. Hie two to be considered are (1) a change in glass level
in the forehearth and mixing areas and (2) a change in the inlet
temperature. A large change in forehearth level can be due to
material being fed into the glass furnace either too fast or too
slowly (due perhaps to a faulty auger drive mechanism) . A large
change in downcomer inlet temperature can be due to a failure of the
forehearth temperature control or the securing of gas to the
flaming jets that heat the glass in the forehearth. Without analysing
the cause consider the effect on the downcomer subsystem.
Any change in either the glass level or the inlet temperature
will result in a violation of the operating or load constraints.






Any increase or decrease in level will result immediately in a change
in flow rate. After an appropriate time delay, the outlet tempera-
ture increases (decreases) for an increase (decrease) in inlet
temperature. In each section, as soon as the change in outlet tem-
perature occurs the controllers react, however there is a lag before
the effect of the controller is realized. Thus this system still
can not be made secure with respect to certain contingencies. This
demonstrates an important point; if a contingency will result in
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the violation of an equality constraint (load or operating) , there
does not exist a security constraint that will insure security with
respect to this contingency. Therefore the load constraints on this
system must be considered more closely.
In reality, there are usually tolerances on the system parameters,
That is, these system parameters may be allowed to vary as follows:
mm max
T < T < T6min - 6 " 6max
without any measurable degradation of overall system performance,
or with some acceptable reduction. If this is the case, then the
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T < T6S *" 6max
6S " 6min
T - d' + d" = T
dj - D *
d" - D $
In the actual implementation, tolerances on the outlet viscosity were
used to generate the maximum and the minimum values for the outlet
temperature. The system simulation was used to find the corres-
ponding tolerances on the other temperature set points. Now the
system can be operated in such a manner to be secure with respect
to either an increase or a decrease (but not both) of
k (o) -ill . J . n-
Ah = 2 max nurr l l
pg
It can be operated so it is simultaneously secure for either an
increase or a decrease of Ah /2 . This illustrates an important
point, that the increasing and the decreasing levels are separate
contingencies and should be treated as such.
First consider an increase in level. The maximum increase for
which the system can be made secure is Ah and for any Ah
T
< Ah










Similarly for a decrease Ah
n ,
where
Ahn < AhD v s
there is a security constraint of
Pg AhD




In this case if
AhT + Ahn > AhIDs
then the system can not be secure with respect to both contingencies.
In other problems it may not appear as straightforward as this
example but in essence oo is indirectly an element of the operating
space and the distance from one extreme of the normal portion of
this operating space to another extreme expressed in terms of
oo is oo - oo - . This distance must be mapped into the contin-
max min r^
gency space, of which level is just one element. The corresponding
distance is Ah
,
and this is the maximum change of h for which
this system can be secure without redefinition of the boundary of
the normal operating space . Note that there may be a penalty for







and the penalty is the difference
PS> T6D^ - P CU ' W
Now consider the more complicated contingency, a radical change
in the bulk inlet temperature. Again this should be separated into
two distinct contingencies, the increase and the decrease. First
consider an increase in inlet temperature. There are several effects




thus violating a load constraint. The other temperatures, T-
,
along
the downcomer will increase causing the viscosities to decrease.
The average viscosity will not be equal to the desired constant and
the flow rate will increase.
Since the increasing inlet temperature will result in a decrease in
the power required by the electrical heaters, one of the heaters
may approach its lower limit.
Can the system be made secure with respect to this contingency?





U) • $ U) < tomm max
T6mm < TV < T.
6 6max
Using either the inverse system relations or the simulation one can
find out how the distances TV - TV - and to - w map onto6max 6mm max mm r
the contingency space. Let the corresponding ranges in inlet tem-
perature be AT
nT and AT~ . That is AT~T is the maximum change in
inlet temperature the system can suffer without violating the load
constraint on the outlet temperature and AT„ is the maximum change
in inlet temperature that will not cause a violation of the load
constraint on flow rate. The system can be made secure only with
respect to the smaller change. Before determining this value, the
change' in inlet temperature which will cause a violation of a













= min {ATQi } i
= 1,— ,6,T,u
where AT~ is the maximum increment for which the system can be
made secure. Suppose one would like to be secure with respect to
both an increase of AT
nT





+ AT0D « AT0s
then the security constraints will be
h + -h^- aTod * <k * »t " -fl^- AToi
fT -T . 1 fT T 1
T + 6max 6min
y v 6max- 6nmr T
6min ATQT
A1 0D * x6 $ 6max " ATQT
A1
0I
(u) -io ) (to -co • )
^
v max min ; A „ v max mnr .„
min AT„ OD * max ATft 01
(Jco Goo








and simultaneously secure for either, if
AT
0I
+ AT0D * AT0s






nT and ATnr) , the corresponding con-
straints can be added to the optimization if one wants to be secure
with respect to one of these contingencies. This implementation
of contingency control was carried out to the following extent. The
process was not available for manipulation and study. Therefore,
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a simulation of the process was developed. It was simulated in six
sections corresponding to the six heaters and their areas of direct
influence. Six PID controllers were simulated, added to the process
simulation and tuned. These direct controllers responded to errors
between the sectional outlet temperatures and the temperature set
points. Optimizations to generate these set points where developed
for three cases without security control and then for the same three
cases with security control. These cases were: the minimization of
heater power, the achievement of a linear gradient based only on a
desired outlet temperature and flow rate, and the minimization of
a maximum deviation from a desired flow rate and temperature dis-
tribution. Security control could not be applied to the second
case because the operating space consisted of a single operating
point. The third optimization was the most realistic of the three
and closely approximated the operation of the actual system. The
linear programming problem that was used to minimize the maximum
deviation from a desired flow rate and temperature distribution
contained fifty two constraints, as follows:
8 equality constraints
30 inequality constraints
14 upper and lower bounds
Ideally, one would like to close the loop between the system
and the security controller by calculating the EMV dynamically as





















operating data was not made available to accomplish this. The per-
formance function for the overall glass process was assumed to be
known. In an actual implementation, these would be known and the
loop could be closed. Hie overall implementation is shown in block
diagram form in Figure 6-4.
It is impossible to illustrate the entire normal operating space
as it actually was, because it was a twenty-four dimensional opera-
ting space. However by considering only one section and using the
deviations from the desired input and output temperatures as the
axis, one can project all of the constraints that affect this






This is the operating space as it would be if all other sections
were operating at their desired operating points. The constraints
are numbered. They correspond to the following load and operating
constraints
:
LI CO >, CO •
nun









02 q. <. 3,
The contingencies and the constraints which they can violate (de-
pending upon the magnitude of the contingency and the present








ATQD 02, LI, L4
If one envisions the appropriate security constraints superimposed
on Figure 6-4, then it is easy to see how they restrict operation
to a secure region of this operating space.
In conclusion, the implementation of contingency control to the
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glass manufacturing process was a linear programming problem that
consisted of a minimization of the maximum deviation from a set of
desired system parameters. This minimization was subject to sys-
tem constraints, load constraints, operating constraints, and
security constraints. The system constraints related the desired
system parameters to the variables of the operating space. The
operating and load constraints established the boundary of the
normal operating space. The security constraints moved the opera-
ting and load constraints in order to insure security with respect
to a given contingency. The imposition of security constraints
changed only the requirements vector in the linear programming
problem. The decision as to whether or not to change an element or
a set of elements of the requirements vector in order to secure was
made as -described in chapter three. For each contingency, the
optimization was solved with the new requirements vector. This
would result in a temperature distribution, which was used to cal-
culate the viscosity distribution and the resultant flow rate. These
can be used to calculate the reduction in the overall system per-
formance (or the cost of being secure with respect to this contin-
gency) . This cost can then be compared with the expected improvement





In this dissertation, a number of things were developed.
1) Numerous previously unrelated ideas about system security were
developed into a consolidated set of concepts.
2) These concepts led to the development of security control actions,
that could compensate for disruptive disturbances (contingencies)
.
3) The concepts which were presented serve as the framework for a
new type of control that involves dynamic decision-making, security
and performance. With the advent of security control, computers
will be able to assist in a dynamic decision making process that is
presently performed by human operators and process supervisors.
4) A measure of security that depends on the present operating
point was presented. This measure was used to decide implementation
or non- implementation of security control actions.
5) The cost of security control actions was discussed in order to
develop the guidelines for justifying security control.
6) Several examples were presented to demonstrate not only applic-
ability but details of implementation.
7) These examples were used to demonstrate the origin of security
constraints
.




the implementation aspects of contingency control.
9) An operating space was used throughout the thesis instead of
relating to a state space. This emphasizes the use of variables
which are already available for the operation and control of a
system.
10) The partitioning of the operating space by imposing security
constraints was demonstrated in the downcomer example.
11) The use of a linear program for the constrained optimization
had several advantages. It was a simple and straightforward
implementation. Security decisions could be made based on all of
the operating variables. Operators tend to concentrate their
attention on one or two variables which they hope are the most
significant variables. The enumeration problem was relatively simple,
since only the requirements vector of the linear programming prob-
lem changed.
12) The downcomer example demonstrated that processes which are
presently over constrained can be operated in such a manner to take
advantage of the tradeoff between security and performance. This
was accomplished by creating an operating space. Then a constrained
optimization problem selected the best operating point based on
performance and security. The constraints were directly related to
the set of next contingencies. This set was considered fixed, how-
ever it could have been dynamic without any additional complexity.
The dynamic case required only that the expected monetary value be
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expressed as a function of the present operating point.
Extensions
It is hoped that the immediate extensions of this research will
be in the area of application. The application of security control
leads to a better understanding of the overall system being controlled,
It can lead to the design of better prevention and protection sys-
tems. Hopefully in some systems, it will result in an on-line
implementation of contingency control. In every case where security
control is to be carefully applied, the long term cost of operating
the system will be less.
In addition, research efforts on security control need .to con-
tinue. For example, a computer assisted implementation of contin-
gency-planning could be developed. The diagnostic portion of a
contingency plan can certainly be computerized in order to achieve
a quick reliable diagnosis of an emergency for a complex system.
It may be possible to use the same constrained optimization deve-
loped for contingency control to generate various strategies for
contingency plans on a given system. The development of a greater
understanding of related sequential events (the theory of discrete
events) will assist in the design of better systems for contingency
prevention.
As far as systems theory and the theory of control is concerned,
security control has its own natural decomposition and each section
of the security controller can interact with the various levels of
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multi-level control. In fact in relation to systems theory, this
is an example of a multi-strata control system. The traditional
control with its multi-level decomposition is in the lower stratum.
The security control is in the other stratum with an entirely























There is no special sequence necessary in order to develop these
two strata. One can easily display examples where one has been
developed first and the other later or not at all. In other cases,
it might have been necessary to develop them concurrently even
though neither strata is completely developed. However, with the
help of the set of concepts presented in this thesis, both strata
can now be developed to a greater extent.
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